We Were Soldiers Once … and Young

[book][film][doug]Seems to be a good week for finishing books. We Were Soldiers Once â€¦ and Young—Ia Drang: The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam, by Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore (Ret.) and Joseph L. Galloway, is the book on which the film We Were Soldiers is based.

The film, although gritty and graphic, is probably one of the finest war films ever made, and actually does a better job of integrating the stateside events and human drama with the events on the battlefield than does the book. The book, of course, is more detailed than the film, although I was surprised at the high level of accuracy the film obtained—many historically-based films tend to sacrifice accuracy for drama.

The book covers the events portrayed on screen, including a second (or perhaps continuing) battle that happened nearby shortly after the primary battle ended.

Both book and film are excellent, illustrating the importance of training, leadership, and coordination of forces that are vital to a successful campaign. The book included a criticism that was not in the film—Due to President Johnson’s failure to declare a state of emergency and extend the active-duty tours of draftees and reserve officers, any soldier who had less than 60 days to serve on his enlistment would not be deployed with the First Air Cavalry. This left them both understaffed and cost many of their best-trained men.

There were other Presidential errors as well—the North Vietnamese were allowed to retreat as needed into nearby Cambodia; US forces were forbidden to follow. Overall, though, these are mentioned more for historical background than anything else.

Due to the improved emotional story of the film, I would actually recommend seeing the film before reading the book—something I would rarely prescribe.

5 Replies to “We Were Soldiers Once … and Young”

  1. Pages from the hardback Lt. Col. Moore was the 'Col. Klink' of the WAR.

    He knew nothing, nothing.

    Page 17
    Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's

    1957
    Army Field Manual 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations.

    1960's
    Army Field Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations.

    1962-65
    Army Field Manual 7-20 Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions

    1963
    Army Field Manual 1-100 Army Aviation

    1965
    Army Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership

    By Officers he worked with in 1957!

    Moore “” In 1957 I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams””.

    Moore With 2 1/2 years writing.

    1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics.

    In a unit that was attached to the 11Air Assault Division Test, for a total of 4 years and

    'yet' he retained nothing, nothing about Airmobile tatics.

    Page 37
    Crandall “”Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff””.

    Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight

    routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey.

    Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present.

    Page 60
    As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops

    starts firing their weapons.

    Field Manual 57-35 Airmobile Operations 1963.

    There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time.

    Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass rolling

    around on Hueys floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls.

    Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered

    for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary, So the 2nd

    Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY.

    MYTHS of The Ia Drang Valley.

    Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didnÂ’t.

    and from Persons in the book, That Moore and Galloway write good about, Give in return

    and adds to the MYTHS about the 1/7 and Moore.

    One Reporter Bob Poos of Soldier of Fortune writes that Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th

    Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp.

    Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs.

    Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division.

    >>Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later

    that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore

    commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.<<

    When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry.

    Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in the

    11Air Assault Division in 1963.

    So starts the myths about Lt. Col. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

    Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to

    Columbus 4 hours.

    Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours.

    8 hours to renforce Albany!

    So why didnÂ’t Kinnard send the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY?

    “”They were probally to drunk.””

    They had spent the day of the 17th in the Bars of Pleiku.

    >>The most outrageous LIE.

    Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany.

    There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny.

    A big battered old French army Bugle.

    FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone

    Albany by the reinforcements.<<

    Leadership Principle 1

    Be Technically and Tactically Proficent:

    To know you job thoroughly, you must posses not only specific knowledge of its details but

    also a broad general knowledge concerning its area of intrest.

    You should be competent in combat operations and training as well as in the technical and

    admimistrative aspects of your duties.

    If you demonstrate deficincies in these functions,your subordinates will lose confidance in

    you as a leader.

    Moore under the delusion he has come up with a new Air Assault tatic for the 1st lift, Would

    doom his men.

    And for the want of a nail, The 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry.

    As the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray would grind up, The Troops, Helicopters and Artillary.

    Making them unavalible for other units.

    Leading to the walk to Landing Zone Albany by the 2/7, 1/5.

    What happend?

    It would appear Moore would be the first one chosen by Kinnard for the 11 AIr Assault test,

    When it started up in 1963 but he wasnt.

    Moore 'had To write a letter' to Major General Kinnard ( His Old Boss ) begging for a Infantry

    Battalion in the 11 air Assault Division.

    It wasent till 1964, 1 year after it started, He got the call. ( Only after the 11AirAssault was

    allowed more Battalions to test )

    He didnt get one with the 11 Air Assault, But instead was given a Infantry Battalion in the 2

    Infantry Division.

    The 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry. ( They were ATTACHED to the 11 AirAssault )

    Moore Had never commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

    But one of the hand picked officers by Kinnard in 1963 was Lt. Col McDade.

    He was chosen for the G-1 spot, He would be given command of the 2nd Battilion 7th

    Cavalry around November 7,1965, Aproximately 10 days before the battle of Landing Zone

    Albany.

    McDade Had never Commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

    THERE WAS ANOTHER FACTOR, MOORE AND MCDADE WERE HAVING A POWER

    STRUGGLE.

    Leadership:

    Keep abreast of current military devolopements.

    Moore “”I thought up a new technique for the inital lift.””

    There are only two types of Air assaults.

    Moore under the delusion he had come up with a new technique.

    The Ground Commander ( Moore ) must concider two general types of Airmobile assault

    when preparing the ground tatical plan.

    These types of assaults differ primarily in the proximity of the LZ to the assault objective.

    The first and preferred type is the landing of the assault ehelons immediately on, or adjacent

    to, the objective.

    The secound type of assault involves landing a distance from the objective in a secure LZ,

    and requires assembly, reorganization, and movement to an attack position prior to the

    assault on the objective.

    Some simulare characteristics of Moore and Custer.

    When no one wrote about them, They wrote their own Books.

    Both were considered too Flamboyent, by fellow officers.

    And not well liked.

    George Armstrong Custer ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander of the 1st Battalion

    7th Cavalry at the battle of the Little Bighorn.

    The Indians would wipe the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry out to a man.

    Starting the Indian wars, The UNITED STATES would unite and almost wipe out all the

    Indians taking their lands and putting them on Reservations.

    LT.Col. Harold G. Moore ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander 1st Battalion 7th

    Cavalry.

    At the battle of Landing Zone X-Ray November the 14,1965, Pleiku Provance of South

    Vietnam.

    Moore's men with help from the reinforcement's ( Bco 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry ).

    Saves Landing Zone X-RAY.

    Starting the Vietnam war.

    Which almost tears the United States apart.

    Both Battles ( The Little Bighorn ) and ( Landing Zone X-Ray ) were fought by the 1st

    Battalion 7th Cavalry.

    On a Sunday, In a Valley, By a River, In tall Grass and near a Large Mountian or Hill top.

    Both Commanders were told the size of the enemy troops.

    By their Scouts.

    But didnt belive them.

    Scout to Custer “”There is a very very large Indian camp down there””.

    Custer “”Where I dont see any camp””.

    Intelligence Lieutenant to Col. Moore, “”There is the possibiy of a PAVN Regiment near the

    Chu Pong mountain.””

    >10 Minutes be for take off this was confirmed, By Col. Moore<

    Moore that didn't really bother me.

    Both the Commanders wanted to force the Enemy to stand and fight.

    As the Enemy's tatics were hit and run.

    Custer in the lead charges into the valley his troops behind.

    To cut off the Indians, So they couldn't escape on to the plains.

    Moore, In the lead Huey charges in to the Valley, His troop behind him he would be the first

    one on Landing Zone X-Ray, hopeing the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong wouldn't

    excape in to the mountians and into Cambodia.

    Both would get their wish.

    The Indians and North Vietnamese would send 1,000 or more men out to meet the 1st

    Battalion 7th Cavalry.

    The Commanders then realized that the size of the enemy forces was true.

    Their scouts were right.

    They were out numbered.

    Both battles were defensive.

    After the initial charge by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry, They would pull back, Circle the

    wagons and let the enemy throw them selves at their defense's.

    Custer didn't have renforcements, It would take weeks to get them, His supplies were miles

    behind him.

    The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was wiped out to the man.

    Moore didnt have that problem “”I had something Custer didn't, Reinforcements with in

    Hours.”” + Artillary, Air support, Helicopters.

    But Moore forgot to lay on supplies and water for his troops.

    Moore's Men with the help of the Reinforcements ( Bco 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry ) save

    Landing Zone X-Ray.

    Starting the Vietrnam War.

    It would almost destroy the United States.

    Their Troops FOUGHT VALIANTLY.

    What happend to Moore's H-hour?

    Moore Get's his H-hour 'confused' with the Attack time in the mission order.

    H-hour in Air Assault terms is difined as the time the lead helicopter touches down on the

    Landing Zone.

    Moore puts His H-hour at H-1030.

    He then gets word the Artillary cant fire until H-1017.

    H-hour get delayed.

    1 incremint? ( usually 15 minutes ). < Moore faild to put this in his

    attack order<

    So that should make H-hour H-1045. ( 10:45 am )

    But Moore ( who is in the lead Huey ).

    Dosent set foot on LZ X-Ray until H-1048.

    3 minutes late.

    FICTION, Only to Lt. Col. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway, Cantu, Jack P. Smith's part.

    The other enlisted men, Officers, Junior Officers and the 2/5, Bco 2/7 and 2/7 Battalion

    stories cannot be disputed.

    Moore on his MilitaryTraining

    Moore couldnt READ a MAP?

    Page 30
    November 9, 1965

    Moore “”What does the RED STAR that is on the intelligence map mean?””

    FACT:
    The Red Star is not a military symbol its explanation should have been on the lower right

    side ( margin ) of the map.

    Moore “” I had no doubt the 1/7 my Battalion would be chosen to mount the attack into the Ia

    Drang as the 2/7 had a new commander.

    Fact:

    The 1/7 was closer to the objective then the 2/7 “” and had nothing to do with the

    readiness of the Battalions. (Gen.John J Tolson).

    Page 17
    Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army

    Transport Avation-Combat Operations.

    1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations.

    By Officers he worked with in 1957.

    Page 17
    In 1957 Moore “”I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Pentagon Reasearch and

    developement group.

    Moore “”I was the 1st man in the Airborne Branch””.

    4 years writing and training in Airmobile tatics.

    Yet Moore retained nothing about Airmobile tatics.

    Page 41
    Moore “”I thought up a new technique for the inital lift””.

    There are only 2 types of Air assaults, This is the 2 one.

    Page 37
    Crandall “”Moore wanted Aviation to be present, to be part of his Staff””.

    FM 57-35
    Both the Ground Commander ( Moore ) and Aviation Commander ( Crandall ) or his ALO had

    to coordinate>flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, resuppy.

    Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Avation present.

    FM 57-35
    Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift so the loss of one aircraft does

    not destroy the command structure.

    Page 58
    Moore and Crandall in the same Huey. ( Lead Huey )

    Page 59
    The lift is flying at 110 knots.

    FM 57-35
    When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower

    aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift.

    UH-1B's are Gunships fly at 80 knots,

    UH-1D's are Slicks 110 knots.

    I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal, why didnt Moore lay on water for his men?

    As B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours, And why he said it was not Aviations job

    ( Crandall ) to haul out Wounded Troops?

    B co's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal “”Dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile

    tatics.””

    Page 106
    Moore we needed water, medical supplies and ammo.

    Page 107
    Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept

    begging for water.

    Page 145
    November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water.

    Page 112
    November 14, 1965 While all day long, The Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of

    X-Ray & Galloway came, 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in.

    The Sad Part 1 Wounded troop was not going out.

    Page 106
    Moore “”Hauling Wounded was not the Slick Crews job”” ( Aviation ).

    FM 7-20
    The Battalion Commanders hanbook, Hauling wounded is the secoundary mission of all

    military aircraft.

    Page 63
    Moore used his Command Huey, To haul out a 'non wounded Enemy Prisoner of War'.

    Page 167
    But!

    None his wounded troops!

    “”Lt Franklin terribly wounded was set aside to die””.

    FM 1-100 Army Aviation 1965.
    The Command and Control Huey is to be used for Command and Control ONLY.

    It shouldnt be used for anyother purpose, like RESUPPLY. .

    A Medevac Huey was suppose to fly with the assault echelon ( 1st Lift ).

    Page 105
    A wounded troop was stumbling toward the Aid Station, Galloway “” stay away go

    back””.

    What was this 17 year old's thoughts 50 feet from the aid station and treatment and

    told to stay away?

    FM 57-35
    Page 12, Paragraph 24

    Supply 6 miscellaneous.

    a. probable water supply points are predesingnated and comes in with the fowllowing

    echelon.

    FM 7-20
    Page 271, Paragraph 313 returning aircraft may be used for the evacuation of casualities.

    ural to Moore's after action Report, and Opreation Order For Nov. 14, 1965

    http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

    Moore's after action Report LZ X-Ray Nov 14,1965 page 7 Par E-1 near bottom of page

    NOV 14 1965 Moore “”I did not call in the Med evac Helicopter too frenquently””

    so the Med evac Huey's did and were landing on the 14 Nov 1965.

    Galloway had no military service.

    COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY:

    No one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman.

    Nno matter how proficient he is.

    As he does so. who commands his battalion?

    Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders?

    He is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.

    Page 34
    Moore “”I went to school on the Division Commander, authority must be pushed down to the

    man on the spot.

    Page 40
    Moore “”I personally to influence the action would be in the 1st Huey to land on X-Ray.””

    Page 60 Moore leading his command group clear a sector of X-Ray, on the way back to the

    LZ, meet the troops who were suppose to clear that sector.

    Page 73
    Moore “”I was tempted to join A co or C co's company's men””.

    Page 108
    Moore “”My operations Officer`& the Avaition Liason Officer had controlled all flights into

    X-Ray, 'I then took control', every Huey coming to X-Ray must radio 'me' for landing

    instructions.

    Page 109

    Crandall Moore was now a signalman at the far end of the Landing Zone, Was standing up,

    directing us where to land.

    Page 109
    The Brigade Commander had given Moore pathfinders.

    Page 195
    Moore “”I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company

    Commander of Bco 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry & his men did a safe, clean, job & to look for

    my Missing Troops.

    Moore didnt bring in his execuitive Officer ( 2nd in command ) to help run the battalion

    Command Post.

    Moore on INTEGRITY:< Garade “”F””

    Page 39
    Moore “”we had never maneuvered in combat as a battalion””.

    FACT:
    Page 28
    Moore in October the Battalion made 2 sweeps near An Khe.

    FACT:
    Page 31
    Nov 9 Moore “”We shuttled the Battalion in 16 Hueys””.

    FACT:
    Page 32
    Nov 9 Galloway “”My first time out with Moores 1/7 Battalion”” .

    Original story
    Solider of Fortune November 83 Page 25
    Nov 9 Galloway “”Before nitefall Moore waved his 'Battalion' across a stream””.

    Each Huey could carry 10 Troops.

    10 troops X 16 Hueys=160 Troops per lift.

    Page 30

    A enemy base camp.

    Page 55

    A radio transmision was intercepted, Estamated a N V Regiment was near X-Ray.

    “”10 Minites before lift off this was confirmed”” Col. Moore.

    Page 57
    Commo wire was seen.

    Page 39
    Moore puts only 80 men (5 per Huey) in the inital lift.

    Page 57
    Riflemen extra ammo all they could carry.

    Air Assault tatics:

    Emphasizes maximum inital lift, to get maximum lift each huey carries minimum amount of

    fuel + 30 min reserve, with Refueling & Ammo Points near the Pickup Zone.

    Troops only basic Gear, load of Ammo and web gear ( Rifle, Intrenching Tool, 2 Canteens,

    Bayonet and Poncho and 1st Aid Pack ).

    Page 40
    Moore “”Later lifts could carry more men 100 as fuel burned off””.

    Page 198
    Rear area Operation Officer Dick Merchant “”The Huey could carry 10 men””.

    Page 111
    Winkle””I had a total of 16 men in my Huey””.

    Fourner “”it was left up to each pilot how many men he carried”” on later lifts I was carring 9-

    12 troops.

    How it should have happend according to”” Air Assault Tatics FM 57-35″”.

    With only 16 Hueys weight is a factor, so the inital lift ( the assault echelon ) must contain

    sufficant Troops to secure the Landing Zone.

    The Alowable Cargo Load the ( ACL ) of each UH-1D for this mission should have been

    3,000 pounds as its under 50 nautical miles ( only 14.3 miles to the objective ).

    Using the Space method, A space is defined as the weight of a fully combat equiped troop

    ( 240 pounds ) 10 Troops = 2,400 pounds per Huey.

    Page 39 B co 114 troops, A co 40 troops, Ground Commanders command group 6 for a

    total of 160 troops in the 1st lift.

    Moore is a Pilot?

    Page 58
    Crandall ( The Aviation Commander ) is starting the Huey from the left seat the co-pilot seat,

    “”There is no starter on that side””.

    Page 58
    Moore as they load the Hueys, “”what is the 'flying time' from Plei Me to Landing Zone

    X-Ray””? 14.3 miles.

    Page 37
    Moore and Crandall plan an Air Assault.

    Page 40
    With a time table & failed to put down the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone

    X-Ray, with out this information, How did they plan the Assault?

    Page 58
    Mills 13 min 15 sec.

    Page 59
    Speed ( rate ) 110 knots this time will take them 25 miles away.

    The correct time is 8 min.

    Formula for Time is
    Distance X 60 divide by Rate ( Speed )

    14.3 X 60 = 858 divide by 110 = 7.8 min = 8 min.

    Minutes are rounded up to the nearest min.

    Formula for Distance is rate ( Speed ) X time divided by 60

    110 X 8 = 880 divide by 60 = 14.6miles = 15miles.

    Miles is rounded up to the nearest 1/2 mile.

    Using 7.8 min for time for the distance 110 X 7.8 = 858 divide by 60 = 14.3 miles.

    The distance from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray.

    Page 188
    A blazing flare under an unopened parachute hit the ammo dump, the Sgt.Major grabbed it

    with his bare hands, it burns at 4,000 degrees, it needs the parachute to lite the candle.

    Letter from Randy Wallace, the Screenwriter and Director, about the film: The Wheelhouse

    15464 Ventura Boulevard Sherman Oaks, CA 91403-3002 Randall Wallace 7 February 2001

    To all men who fought in the Ia Drang Valley, November 1965, and their families.

    Gentlemen, As many of you have already heard, we are preparing to make a film version of

    Hal Moore and Joe Galloway's book WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE…AND YOUNG.

    As you can imagine, this is an enormously ambitious undertaking.

    As the prologue of Hal and Joe's landmark book states, “”Hollywood has gotten the story of

    the Vietnam veteran wrong every damn time, whetting the knives of twisted politics on the

    bones of our dead brothers.””

    Well this time we mean to get it right.

    This is not to say that any of us making the film are unconcerned with accuracy.

    The Disclamer> ( It is not meant to tell the story ) of each individual, ( or to capture the

    same kind of truth ) a documentary would.

    I salute you.

    Best regards, Randall Wallace

    The 1st Cavalry Division Commander Kinnard, Had to use the whole of the division resorces

    to keep Lt. Col. Moore from losing Landing Zone X-Ray.

    Kinnard “”I violated a lot of priniples about how hard you work your guy's and how many

    hour's you fly your helicopters.””

    “”I literally flew the Blades off the choppers.””

    Things wrong with the trailer Why is Moore shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side

    at X-Ray?

    When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat.

    Page 58 hardback, Page 67
    Paperback Moore as they land at X-Ray.

    As Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the

    mountian.

    Page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback
    Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the

    over head shot there are 6 Hueys.

    As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist.

    Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback

    The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are

    either in a column, trail formation< left are both are the same formation or an echelon right

    Page 59, page 68 paperback.
    COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
    No one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman, No matter how proficient he is.

    As he does so, who commands his battalion?

    Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders?

    he is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.

    “”What the hell is the is the colonel doing up here?”” Sergeant Thompson ask.

    Page 195 hardback, page 228 paperback
    Moore as the battle started “” I was tempted to join Nadal's or Edwards men; But I might get

    pined down and simply become another rifleman.””

    “”My duty was to LEAD riflemen.””

    Page 73 hardback, page 85 paperback.
    Why is Moore shown leading the troops from the 1/7 in the battle for X-Ray, when he didnt,

    He was in the command post during combat, and only came out during Lull's in the battle.

    Moore “” For almost 8 hours I had been involved in the mimute-to-minute DIRECTION of the

    battle.
    Now I wanted to personally walk the perimeter.

    Just befor dark Sergeant Major Plumley and I broke away from the command post and set

    out to check the perimeter.””

    Page 131 hardback, page 155
    The only troops He lead were troops from the B co 2/7 and only the last counter attack on

    the 16th around noon.

    Moore “”I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company

    Commander Diduryk of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job & to look for my Missing

    Troops.

    We killed 27 more and crushed all resistance.””

    Page 195 hardback, page 228 paperback
    Moore calles for illumination, and his mortars fire. Moore “”No morter fire would be permited

    especially illumination rounds.

    I wanted the morters to hold back their illumination rounds for our last light in the sky in

    case the air and artillery folk used up all of their flares””.

    Page 184 hardback, page 216 paperback
    Moore didnt call in the broken arrow code Hasting the FAC did.

    ((Page 149 hardback, page175 paperback ))

    What other troops did Moore gets credit for doing it.

    Who am I? lzalbany65@aol.com

    Russell L. Ross
    1741 Maysong ct. San Jose,
    Ca 95131-2727
    ph 408 926-9336

    Sept 1965-66 SP/4 Russell L. Ross RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry

    Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam.

    1964 B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning,

    Georgia.

    1965 B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st

    Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

    And in July 1965 I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile.

    JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY ( Rambo The Reporter ) IS NOW SELLING HIS COMBAT

    PICTURES FROM LANDING ZONE X-RAY.

    Joseph L. Galloway The Walter Mitty of the war, Rambo the Reporter, A Plagiarist, Fiction

    writer, and now add fraud.

    Galloway brandishes a Swedish K submachinegun at Danang in August 1965.

    Joe prior to Xray battle He is the only civilian to receive a medal from the U.S. Army for valor

    during the Vietnam War—a Bronze Star with Combat V for rescuing wounded soldiers under

    fire in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

    ( Even though Moore didnt see him do this he wrote him up for it .added by me )

    A veteran of 42 years in journalism with United Press International and U.S. News & World

    Report, he is coauthor with retired Army Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore of We Were

    Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: Random House, 1992).

    Galloway—the award-winning newsman and current special consultant to Secretary of State

    General Colin Powell spoke recently with Fred L. Schultz at U.S. Naval Institute

    headquarters.

    STEVE NORTHUP http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROgalloway02.htm

    Why is Joseph L. Galloway altering his combat pictures of Landing Zone X-Ray?

    Is it becouse they show the truth and not the lies written by Galloway and Moore in their

    Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young ( The X-Ray part ).

    Joseph L. Galloway is altering some of his combat pictures to match the story line in the

    book, as he now has the equipement to change them.

    !!!!!WARNING!!!!!

    If you buy these pictures, be warned, some of the pictures you see at this

    web site isnt the orignal pictures.

    Galloway has now since changed the ural here is the new ones http://www.weweresoldiers.net/
    http://www.weweresoldiers.net/plate2.htm

    The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the

    Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley,

    November 14-16, 1965.

    The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers

    involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought.

    The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a

    handful of participants in the action.

    ( Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people ).

    These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming

    movie, “”We Were Soldiers Once…And Young””, starring Mel Gibson.

    A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe. Ia Drang

    Scholarship Fund….

    As a lasting tribute to the men of the 1st of the 7th Cavalry who gave so much in the Ia

    Drang, a permanent scholarship fund was established for the children and grandchildren of

    those who died in action in this heroic event.

    To honor that commitment, 10% of the purchase price of every Joe Galloway at the Ia Drang

    photo will be donated to the fund.

    Stories Part Fiction he embelished for them. U.S. NEWS and World Report

    Oct 29,1990 Page 32 Fatal Victory

    Page 36 Vietnam Story.

    ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized.

    U.S. News and World Report

    Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire

    SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485.

    U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991

    Page 49 “”Who's Afraid of the truth””

    SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker.

    ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ).

    In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect

    the wounded.

    BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavely armed Reporter in Vietnam.

    Soldier of Fortune March 2004

    http://WWW.sofmag.com

    Page 27 Should Journalists Carry Weapons by Bob Poos

    Page 30 “”Take The Rifle!””

    Joseph L. Galloway “” I had learned the first law of Combat at Plei Me: Carry all the water

    and Ammo you can hump””.

    “”You can't eat if your fuckin' dead…””

    This was spoken by a Journalists with no Military training or service, In a war zone.

    Joe Galloway, author of We Were Soldiers Once, and Young, as a war

    correspondent in Vietnam, Said “”Shoot you with which ever seems the right weapon.

    I also carried a Colt .38-special belt gun.””

    [ Col. Charlie ] Beckwith, when I was leaving Plei Me, Noticed I had no weapon and ordered

    a SGM to fetch me one an M-16 and a sack full of magazines.

    I told him that in spite of what he had me doing the last 3-4 days and nights-

    manning a machine gun- I was still, technically speaking, a non- combatant.””

    ' Ain't no such thing in these mountains, Boy.

    Take the Rifle' I took the rifle and was carring it and 20 full magazines , plus a thousand

    rounds of boxed ammo in my pack when I got off the bird in X-Ray. ( 1,400 rounds )

    I had learned the first law of combat: carry all the waters and ammo you can hump.””

    You can't eat if your fuckin' dead.””

    Joseph L. Galloway a noncombatant Reporter ( Geneva convention ) carried 1 M-16 Rifle

    with 1, 400 rounds of 5.56 ammo.

    400 rounds in magazines = 20 magazines.

    1 magazine = 20 rounds per magazine.

    1, 000 boxed rounds, in back pack.

    1,400 rounds weight?

    1 case 5.56 ammo.

    2 11' x 7' metal cans per case, weight empty metal cans empty 2 pounds each.

    840 rounds per can.

    1, 680 rounds per case.

    Galloway carried 1,400 rounds total weight.

    Case of ammo 5.56 1, 680 rounds
    Galloway – 1, 400 rounds
    = – 280 rounds less per case ammo.

    less 280 rounds per case = 14 boxed 20 rounds each box.

    Galloway a noncombatant carried aprox 50-60 pounds of 5.56 Rifle ammo.

    Galloway “”I have put down my cameras and picked up my rifle and used it””.

    Page 32

    Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege,

    and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine

    gun.

    With two other reporters, After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway

    an M-16 rifle.

    Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was “”A civilian

    noncombatant.””

    As you see there is no logic.

    Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after

    the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant?

    The question is why didnt Galloway join the service?

    He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter.

    He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the

    battle.

    He start's to play Soldier.

    You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier.

    Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to Americian troops, in

    His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona.

    He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted

    and go where he wanted to at any time.

    Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he

    pleased.

    Page 35
    November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade

    headquaters.

    Galloway “” I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those

    $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ).

    Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls.

    to record events, his mind set is playing soldier.

    Page 32
    Galloway writes: “” At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the

    emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee.

    Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30

    secounds.

    If you were careless it blew your arm off.

    If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the

    price for violating the UCMJ.

    Conspiring to take a 4 Million Dollar Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16

    Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf.

    I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left.

    Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in?

    The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the

    Battlefield?

    Did he sell it when he left?

    If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it? Galloway conspired with a friend

    ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp.

    There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area,

    The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith

    needed, medical, and ammo.

    At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a

    machinegun and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle.

    MYTH's:
    Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C

    company's.

    Galloway was taking pictures.

    Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was.

    TRUTH:
    Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28

    Galloway writes “”During a ( LULL!!).”” I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk)

    naplmed the Command post.

    MYTH's:
    Page 35 Galloway

    The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree.

    TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83

    Page 25 Galloway

    They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree.

    Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During “” LULL's “” in the Battle.

    As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post.

    He only took pictures of the dead and wounded.

    Where are his action pictures?

  2. MOORE LEFT SOME OF HIS DEAD TROOPS ON X-RAY!

    Moore said he wouldnt leave any troop behind on the Battlefield dead or alive.

    ArmChair General

    “Didn’t you go back to the Ia Drang in March for Operation LINCOLN?”

    Steven R. Hansen “Yes, we did return to the Ia Drang.

    ++In fact, we air assaulted back into XRay.

    ++It was quiet.”

    ++The mission was to search for and retrieve the remains of some MIAs.( Missing in Action )

    ++We found them.

    The battlefield had been cleaned up pretty good by both sides.

    We found a scattering of stuff and I noticed the remains of one NVA soldier near the “Ant

    Hill” that sheltered the command post during the battle.

    Isnt it strange! Col. Moore said he brought every one back even the dead.
    ( page 198, We were Soldiers Once and Young.)Hardback

    Moore said he wasnt leaving anyone on LZXRAY !

    He did!, then he sneaks back to retrive the ones he left behind on X-Ray.

    http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p=2785&page=1

    Memories of Vietnam

    Submitted by Stephane Moutin-Luyat

    Steve Hansen

    http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p&page=1&p=2785&page=7

    Memories of Vietnam

    Tuesday, July 18, 2006 by Stephane Moutin-Luyat

    Steve Hansen, two-tour veteran of the Vietnam war, shares his thoughts and experiences in

    this fascinating interview.

    http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2002/03-25-2002/vo18no06_hal_moore.htm

    The Real Hal Moore
    Interview of Lt. General Harold G. Moore by William F. Jasper
    TNA: Both in the book and the movie, your commitment and your promise to

    your men, to bring them all home, dead or alive, comes through very

    strongly.

    Was that Army doctrine or was that purely Hal Moore?

    Moore: No, that was not Army doctrine.

    I was very close to my men.

    When we were ordered to Vietnam in August 1965, I had been training my

    battalion for 14 months.

    I knew all my NCOs, my sergeants.

    We trained together intensely.

    We trusted each other, knew our lives depended on each other.

    We were a family of fighting men.

    Before we left for Vietnam, I gathered all my men on the parade ground at Ft.

    Benning, Georgia, just like in the movie, and I told them that we?re going into

    battle far from home against a tough enemy on his own turf.

    I told them: “Some of us are going to die ? maybe me, certainly some of you.

    But I promise you this: If you go down, I?m going to bring you back.

    And if I go down, I hope you bring me back.”

    In later years, I?ve had many of my troopers tell me that that promise meant a

    great deal to them and helped them in battle, because they knew if they went

    down that they would not be left lying on the ground for the vultures, insects,

    and weather, but would be brought back to their families for burial.

    And I never lost a man in two wars, Korea or Vietnam.

    After the Ia Drang battle, I was promoted, made commander of a brigade of

    3,000 men.

    We lost a man on the Bong Son Plain.

    He got separated from his unit.

    I turned out the whole brigade and we hunted for him for two days.

    We finally found him; he was dead, but we brought him home.

    MOORE LEFT SOME OF HIS DEAD TROOPS ON X-RAY!

    http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p&page=1&p=2785&page=7

    » Home > Personal Stories, Front Page Features > Memories of Vietnam

    ——————————————————————————–

    Memories of Vietnam
    Submitted by Stephane Moutin-Luyat

    The NCOs that came in as replacements were drawn from Army units in the States and Europe and they were trained, capable men. So to were some of the lower graded soldiers. And of course we received some privates direct from Basic and Advanced training. Later in the war almost every replacement would be raw meat.

    In December I went on R&R to Hong Kong. Most of the men wanted Bangkok. It had a reputation for being cheap and wide open. I wanted Hong Kong because I wanted an escape from Viet Nam and anything like it. And while Hong Kong was Asian it was also British and a very nice place to be. I enjoyed my self immensely.

    Shortly after my return I was sitting in the NCO club we built with some friends and looked around. Almost all the faces were new. Those of us who had been together at Benning stayed connected. But we were more reserved about the replacements. Why make a friend just to see him die.

    Read LTC Moore’s after action report in full here

    All those new recruits would soon experience combat. In January, the 1st Cav launched Operation MASHER in the populated coastal province of Binh Dinh, the biggest search & destroy operation in Vietnam to date, and once again the 1/7 and 3d Brigade would find themselves in heavy fighting, especially around the hamlet of Phung Du north of Bong Son. It’s always been one of the most interesting operation for me, what can you tell us about it? it must have been a complete change of scenery from the Central Highlands.

    When I returned from R&R I got a new job. Warren Adams, the company First Sergeant, pulled me up to Company Headquarters to be the field logistics sergeant. It was not a real job, in the sense of being authorized in the official Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) but it was necessary function during operations.

    D Company was not a maneuver element. The three platoons, Recon, Heavy Mortar, and Anti-Tank were combat support elements and their location and employment were usually established by the Battalion Operations Officer or S3. The D company CP was usually, but not always, collocated with the heavy mortars. One of our missions was to monitor the battalion command radio frequency and track the location of the other companies. By staying abreast of the situation we were ready to reconstitute the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) if the principal TOC was overrun or lost during an air lift.

    Bong Son was my first operation as a member of the company field headquarters.

    We had operated in populated areas around Qui Nhon during our initial toughing up phase and while we were reconstituting after the Ia Drang. But we had not made any significant contact. And the populace, at least on the surface, seemed loyal to the South Vietnamese Government. At Bong Son we would engage NVA regulars again and much of the populace was openly hostile to us.

    Having said this, I also must say that I did not participate directly in any combat at Bong Son. But I did monitor the radios and I was very aware of the intense fighting that was going on just a kilometre or two from our support locations. And, for a time, we were located at the airstrip and I saw the casualties come in. For me, it was kind of sureal. I was there but I was somewhat detached. I think it was a coping mechanism. A bit of guilt for being relatively safe and a bit of relief for not being at risk.

    We operated on the Bong Son plain twice. In January 66 and again in March (my recal may be faulty). No matter what the higher ups called the operations there we called them Bong Son One and Bong Son Two. At reunions we still talk about them. Most agree that the actual combat was worse than anything at XRay even though the tactical situations never was,

    At this time of my life the events of Bong Son One and Two run together.

    Here are some things I recall.

    Riding by truck all night from An Khe, down Highway 19 to Qui Nhon and then up Highway 1 to Bong Son, immediately boarding Hueys and making a combat assault. My understanding is we did this because Bong Son was to far from An Khe to stage the assault from there. But the Hueys could fly empty from An Khe and arrive with enough fuel to stage the assault. In so doing, we achieved tactical surprise. It was a well conceived and brilliantly executed maneuver.

    Walking in sand, sleeping in sand, eating sand, trying to dig in in sand, hating sand.

    Watching a Charlie model Huey gun ship coming in with fuel streaming out of it. The left side opened up like a shark bite and the gunner dead and hanging by a strap. Aparently one or more of the rockets in the missing pod had detonated on launch or been hit by ground fire.

    Going to the S1 tent to pick up replacements. Most were 82nd Airborne veterans of the Dominican Republic. On the way back we passed by Charlie Med. There were more dead GIs wrapped in ponchos there than the 82nd had lost during their entire mission in the DR.

    Learning Sergeant First Class Kennedy, a C Company hero in the Ia Drang, had been killed by friendly fire. Fire from a 106 in our own Anti Tank platoon.

    Hearing an explosion nearby and finding out one of our 82nd Airborne replacements had snagged a grenade when he was setting his 81 mm mortar bipod down. It blew his arm off and he died almost immediately in front of me.

    Seeing a senior NCO (not a D Company man) throw his boots down a well and reporting them stolen while he slept.

    Seeing Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and his wife in matching black flight suits walking among the ordinary soldiers and thanking them for their service.

    Showing no interest in seeing Nancy Sinatra put on a USO show.

    Seeing those damn pictures in Life magazine and feeling guilty and relieved all over again.

    ====================================================================

    Didn’t you go back to the Ia Drang in March for Operation LINCOLN? not sure 1/7 was involved in this one, but after Bong Son the Cav was known as the “swing” division, alternating between the coastal plain and the Central Highlands. How was your perception of the war at that time after several months in country? I guess morale was pretty high in the 1st Cav, did you have the feeling that you were turning the tide in Vietnam, were you told anything about the big picture?

    Yes, we did return to the Ia Drang. In fact, we air assaulted back into XRay. It was quiet. The mission was to search for and retrieve the remains of some MIAs. We found them.

    The battlefield had been cleaned up pretty good by both sides. We found a scattering of stuff and I noticed the remains of one NVA soldier near the “Ant Hill” that sheltered the command post during the battle.

  3. Joe Lee Galloway’s true fillings about the Vietnam Veteran.” Damed if I’d want to go for a walk in the sun with them.

    http://soldiersystems.net/tag/joseph-galloway/

    Joseph Galloway (His collection of lies)

    http://www.airborneinnormandy.com/galloway_collection_of_lies.htm

    Joe Lee Galloway’s true fillings about the Vietnam Veteran.

    ” Damed if I’d want to go for a walk in the sun with them.

    “BLACK GI’s going thru long involved BLACK POWER identification rituals.”

    Joe Lee Galloway “I speak for the Vietnam Veteran.”

    BUT, JOE LEE GALLOWAY’S TRUE FEELING ABOUT THE VIETNAM VETERAN.

    ” Damed if I’d want to go for a walk in the sun with them.”

    “Black GI’s going thru long involved black power identification rituals.”

    “THE REST ARE JUST COMMITTING SUICIDE.”

    Here dead we lie

    Because we did not choose

    To live and shame the land

    from which we sprung

    Life to be sure

    Joe Lee Galloway

    Joe Lee Galloway “I speak for the Vietnam Veteran.”

    Joe Lee Galloway ” THIS WAR WE CAN’T WIN” March 1965 with the Marines ,I was(disabused )

    of that notion pretty early on with the( Marines.)

    disabuse = Free from Error, Fallacy or Misconception.

    JOE LEE GALLOWAY two faced.

    You thought that, but couldn’t say it in your reporting?

    Joe Lee Galloway ” This war we can’t win.”

    worked for UPI. We were not paid to have an opinion and if we did we were to keep it to ourselves.

    I And for me, there was the other thing. I thought, “ This war we can’t win.”

    http://www.historynet.com/interview-joe-galloway-soldiers-reporter-speaks-his-mind.htm

    Interview with Joe Galloway: Soldier’s Reporter Speaks His Mind

    BY VIETNAM MAGAZINE
    4/18/2011 • VIETNAM FIRST PERSON, VIETNAM WAR

  4. Joe Lee Galloway’s original story of the battle of LZ X-Ray Nov 14-16 1965, Vietnam Soldier of Fortune 1983, If You Want a Good fight. by Joe Lee Galloway web page to https://docplayer.net/51922376-If-you-want-a-good-fight.html Joe Lee Galloway lied, took other reporters stories after they died as his own,embellished his stories, Where he was in Vietnam. He wasn’t at Plei Me, He flew over the camp on the 24, Oct. 1965,Joe  Lee Galloway claims to get to Plei Me on the 21, Oct. 1965.In Ken Burns Vietnam ( River Styx ), Joe Lee Galloway said he got there on the 23, Oct.1965.  Story by Joe Lee Galloway is FICTION,  LZ X-Ray 14-16 Nov 1965.Joe Lee Galloway “I was pressing Col.Brown for my promised ride into action.”Brown also wanted a firsthand look at the situation, so we headed off in his chopper for X-Ray.A 25-meter circle of death and destruction.When Brown told Hal G. Moore he was overhead and wanted to land, Hal G. Moore told him no way.Choppers were downed and men killed in that last lift and the LZ was simply too hot.Joe Lee Galloway  “As I looked out the left side of the chopper, trying to make sense out of the smoke and confusion below, an A IE Skyraider screamed below us trailing smoke and fire and slammed into the forest. No parachute.”Brown reluctantly ordered the chopper to turn around and leave X-Ray, dropping me Joe Lee Galloway off at LZ Falcon where the supporting artillery batteries were located.FACT: story by Joe Lee Galloway, below is what really what happened Nov 14-16 1965 at LZ X-Ray.Joseph Lee Galloway’s original story of Landing Zone X-RAY Nov,14-16, 1965 Twenty                                  JAMESTOWN ( N.Y. )  POST- JOURNAL- Wednesday Evening,November 17,1965————September 14th,1965 around 2:00 pm, LZ X-Ray, Ia Drang Valley ,Vietnam.Joe Lee Galloway “+Brig. Gen. Richard Knowles, deputy commander of the air cavalry division, OFFERED ME A RIDE IN HIS HELICOPTER.”Joe Lee Galloway “WE CIRCLED OVER THE BATTLE GROUND.( LZ X-Ray Air strikes went in below us. An American A1E Skyraider was hit on a low- level bombing run, and the pilot had no chance to bail out.The plane crashed and exploded in a cluster of trees.Knowles “Men are dying down there, but they are doing their job. “This is good,” Knowles said.” This is whatwe came for.”We’ve got a U.S. battalion well -equipped down there.” Joseph Lee Galloway’s original story of Landing Zone X-RAY Nov,14-16, 1965 Twenty                                  JAMESTOWN ( N.Y. )  POST- JOURNAL- Wednesday Evening,November 17,1965                        WOUNDED SOLDIER LOSES HALF HIS PLATOON IN BITTER CHU PONG FRAY
    By JOSEPH GALLOWAY Chu Pong Mountain, South VietNam ( UPI )—- The soldiers eyes were red from loss of sleep, and maybe a bit from crying too, now that it was all over.A three-day growth of beard stubbled his cheeks. But was hard to see because of the dirt. He was hurt, in terrible pain, but you’d never know it. Slivers of shrapnel had ripped his chest and spared his leg.He sat on the landing zone below the Chu Pong mountain where more Americans had died than ever before in a battle against Communists in a war over Viet Nam. He had gone through hell — three days of it— and still a bit dazed, more from lack of sleep then his wounds, though. When I walked up to him, he spoke, But not to me in particular, nor to the other guys sitting around sipping  the first hot cup of coffee they had since the fight began.                                                                         Loses a Friend” I took care of 14 of  ’em myself,” He said. “They were tough little bastards. You had to shoot them to pieces before they quit coming . . . just rip them apart.”I squatted on my heels waiting for him to say more, But he didn’t. Somebody told me he had lost half of his platoon, including a friend he had served with for more than eight years. “What is his name?” I ask.” It’s not important,” the  sergeant slouching nearby said. “He’s just one of us and he did a damn good job.”Everyone did a damn good job. And nobody knew it better than Gen. Knowles, task force commander and deputy commander of the 1st Air Cavalry.”These men were just great,” he told me. “They were absolutely tremendous. I’ve never seen a better job anywhere, anytime Back From Battle Monday  another American soldier walked out of the jungle into the valley of death. Bullets whizzed over his head and kicked up dirt at his feet.” Get down you fool!” We shouted.The GI kept walking, He carried no weapon, He walked straight and tall.A mortar shell exploded nearby, He didn’t waver, Shrapnel chopped off branches above my head. But the American out there in the open came on until he was within a few feet of the battalion command bunker. He looked funny, dazed.Then we knew,  he was shell shocked. He paused for a moment and looked around. He recognized the aid station set up under the trees and walked toward it.Just as the soldier reached the station he slumped to his knees, then pitched forward on his face, That is when we saw his back for the first time.It wasn’t pretty, It had been blown open by a communist mortar.Medics were unable to reach the soldier because of the almost solid wall of communist bullets and jagged steel fragments coming from the jungle. So he walked out, The bullets and mortar did not bother him anymore, He had his.  Veterans Cried The men of the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry fought like heroes. They died the same way, Some took their wounds without a whimper. Seasoned Veterans cried.Col. Hal Moore of Bardstown, Ky., the commanding officer of the 7th Battalion, 1st cavalry, Came over to me,tears streaming down his face, His men were catching from the slopes of this mountain range less than five miles from the Cambodian border.I’m kind of emotional about this, so excuse me,” Moore said to me. “But I want you to tell the American people that these men are fighters.”Look at them.”Moore pointed to a Negro soldier lying in the shade of a tree. A Communist bullet had torn a huge hole in his stomach. The soldier had his hands over the wound. You could see him bite his lip. He was in terrific pain, But he made no whimper as he waited for a medical helicopter.” Look at them,” Moore said again. ” They’re great and the American people ought to know it.”                                                              WAR “ACCIDENT”It was shortly after 8:30 a.m. Monday when one of those terrible accidents of war happened.I was sitting in the command bunker, A mound of dirt screening us from the communist snipers, looking at the wounded in the aid station just a few yards away.Suddenly, I felt a searing heat on my face.An American fighter-bomber had misjudged the Communist positions, and dropped a load of napalm. The flaming jelly gasoline, impossible to shake or scrape off once it hits skin, splashed along the ground in a huge dragon’s tail of fire less then 25 yards away.Screams penetrated the roar of the flames. two Americans stumbled out of the inferno. Their hair burned off in an instant. their clothes were incinerated.” Good God!” Moore cried. Another plane was making a run over the same area. The colonel grabbed a radio.” You’re dropping napalm on us!” he shouted. ” Stop those damn planes.”At almost the last second, the second plane pulled up and away, its napalm tanks still hanging from the wings.It was an hour before a medical helicopter could get into the area and tend to the two burned men. One GI was a huge mass of blisters, the other not quite so bad. Somehow his legs had escaped the flames. But he had breathed fire into his lungs and he wheezed for air.
    A MEDIC ASK ME TO HELP GET THE MEN INTO THE HELICOPTER WHEN IT ARRIVED. THERE WERE NO LITTERS. TENDERLY, WE PICKED THE SOLDIERS UP. I HELD A LEG OF THE MOST SERIOUSLY BURNED MAN. I WASN’T TENDER ENOUGH. A BIG PATCH OF BURNED SKIN CAME OFF IN MY HAND.                                                         VC BATTALIONS Chu Pong Mountain rises 2,500 feet from the valley below. From the top, you could almost lob a mortar shell into Cambodia. The mountain slope were heavily jungled. And they hid at least two battalions of North Vietnamese Army regulars—- possibly the same troops who pinned down two companies of air cavalrymen not far away about a week ago.The cavalry were looking for them, spoiling for a fight. They found the Communist Monday and dropped by helicopter into a small landing zone about the size of a football field at the base of the mountain on the valley floor. One platoon got about 300 yards up the mountain before the Communist opened up. From Behind, cut it off and fired on the main cavalry force from three sides with small arms, heavy machine-guns, and mortars.Time and again, the cavalrymen tried to move in and help the platoon’ pull back, It was futile. The fire was to heavy. The platoon spent the night on the mountainside. Their losses were heavy, but the damage to the Communist was said to be heavier.”We got 70 communist bodies stacked up in front of our positions,” the platoon leader radioed back Monday.                                                                           Men Dying It was shortly before noon Sunday when the cavalrymen swept down in the area about 12 miles west of Pleiku. Ever since the nine day battle around the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, the cavalrymen have been sweeping the jungles and running into sporadic contact with hard-core Communist units.+Brig. Gen. Richard Knowles, deputy commander of the air cavalry division, OFFERED ME A RIDE IN HISHELICOPTER. WE CIRCLED OVER THE BATTLE GROUND. Air strikes went in below us. An American A1E skyraider was hit on a low- level bombing run, and the pilot had no chance to bail out. The plane crashed and exploded in a cluster of trees.Men are dying down there, but they are doing their job. “This is good,” Knowles said.” This is what we came for. We’ve got a U.S. battalion well -equipped down there.”                                                                    Many Dead I got my chance to join the men on the ground about 8 P.M. I went with a helicopter loaded with supplies andammunition. we were level with the middle of the mountain and in the darkness we could see the muzzle flashes of rifles and machine-gun spitting bullets at us. I said a prayer.Sgt.Maj. Basil Plumley of Columbus, Ga., met us at the landing zone, and led me back to Col. Moore’s command bunker.” Watch your step,” Plumley said, ” There were dead people, all over here.” They were dead Americans many wrapped in ponchos.At Day break Monday, Medical helicopters began landing and taking off again with the wounded.A detail was assign the job of collecting weapons and ammunition from the wounded before they were evacuated.

  5. from a letter Joe Lee Galloway wrote to Hal G. Moore in 1971

    QUOTE: Joe Lee Galloway:”Black GI’s going thru long involved black power identification rituals.”
    quote is from
    page 171 Mike Guardia’s book HAL G. MOORE A SOLDIER ONCE… AND ALWAYS

    BUT, JOE LEE GALLOWAY’S ” TRUE FEELING ” ABOUT THE VIETNAM VETERAN.

    QUOTE: Joe Lee Galloway:”Black GI’s going thru long involved black power identification rituals.”

    Quote: Joe Lee Galloway:” Damed if I’d want to go for a walk in the sun with them.”

    QUOTE: Joe Lee Galloway:”THE REST ARE JUST COMMITTING SUICIDE.”

    QUOTE: Joe Lee Galloway:

    “Here dead we lie

    Because we did not choose

    To live and shame the land

    from which we sprung.”

    Life to be sure

    picture of Joe Lee Galloway reading the poem above

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